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Ludwig: Ludwig: Special Statutes of Limitation

Special Statutes of Limitation and the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act: Case
Closed?
State ex reL Estate of Perry v. Roper'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) 2 was enacted by Congress "to provide for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative
proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service.", 3 To this end, the SCRA prevents
any period of military service from being "included in computing any period
or
limited by law, regulation, or order . . by or against the servicemember
''
assigns.
or
administrators,
executors,
heirs,
the servicemember's
In State ex rel. Estate of Perry v. Roper, the Court of Appeals for the
Western District of Missouri applied the SCRA to prevent the application of a
"special" statute of limitations contained in Missouri's Probate Code.5 This
note examines the court's decision and the policy implications thereof in light
of the history of the SCRA and Missouri Revised Statutes section 473.050,
the statute of limitations on presentment of wills under Missouri law.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
6

Marvin J. Perry died on July 25, 2003. His son, Paul E. Perry, filed a
petition in the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Boone County to enter
a self-proving will into probate on September 9, 2004.7 Perry claimed that,
pursuant to the SCRA, his active duty service in the U.S. Army from January
8, 2003, to July 13, 2004, tolled Missouri's one-year statute of limitations
applicable to presentment of wills and applications for letters testamentary.8
One day after Perry filed the petition and application, Judge Ellen S.
Roper entered an order denying both, stating that the "Petition for Probate of
1. 168 S.W.3d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
2. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-596 (2000). The
provision applicable to tolling statutes of limitation is found in section 526 of the act.
Id. at § 526.
3. 50 U.S.C. app. § 502.
4. Id. at § 526(a).
5. State ex rel. Estate of Perry v. Roper, 168 S.W.3d 577, 589 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005)
6. Id.at 581.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Will and Application for Letters Testamentary are denied, the Court finding
more than one year has passed since the date of death of decedent which occurred on July 25, 2003." 9 Perry filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri on September 23,
2004.10 On October 8, Perry filed a notice of appeal with the court, II and on
October 14, 2003, the court entered its writ of certiorari.' 2 After the parties
filed their briefs, Perry filed a motion to consolidate the writ case with his
direct
appeal, and the Court of Appeals granted this motion shortly thereaf13
ter.
On review, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine whether Perry's period of service was sufficient to render his filings timely. 14 The court decided that "[a] trial court's
dismissal of an action based upon the running of a statute of limitations is a
final, appealable order" 5 and that the SCRA "acts to toll the limitations period contained in [section] 473.050, which pertains to the bringing of a proceeding in probate court."' 6 Ultimately, the court held that the SCRA preempted a state statute of limitations, and so long as his military service qualified under the terms of the SCRA, Perry was able to file a petition to present
a will and an application for letters testamentary despite the running of the
statute of limitations. 17
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The court in Perry dealt with two main areas of law. First, the court examined the procedural posture of the case in light of Missouri law dealing
with appeals in probate matters. Second, the court examined the preemption
of Missouri Revised Statutes section 473.050, defining the time limitations
for presenting a will for probate, by the provision of the Servicemembers'
Civil Relief Act (SCRA) that provides for the tolling of statutes of limitation,
50 U.S.C. app. § 526.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 581-82.
13. Id. at 582.
14. Id. at 589.
15. Id. at 583.
16. Id. at 587.
17. Id. at 589.
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A. Certiorari,Appeals, and MissouriRevised Statutes Section 4 72.160
After a court has issued an order, a party may petition for a writ of certiorari from a higher court requesting review of that order.' 8 A writ of certiorari is permitted by Missouri Revised Statutes section 386.510 to authorize an
inquiry into whether an original court order is reasonable or lawful. 19 When
issued, such a writ commands a lower court to "certify the record" for review
by a higher court.2 0 Missouri allows writs of certiorari only for the purposes
of reviewing "'questions of jurisdiction, power, and authority of [an] inferior
tribunal ... and all questions of irregularity in the proceedings. ' 21 In Missouri, the law has long been settled
that if a proper appeal is possible for a
22
given order, certiorari will not lie.
Under Missouri law, grounds for appeal in probate matters are defined
by statute rather than by court rules. 23 The statute governing probate appeals,
Missouri Revised Statutes section 472.160, specifies a number of circumstances under which appeals are allowed, closing with the catch-all phrase:
"[i]n all other cases where there is a final order or judgment of the probate
division of the circuit court under this code except orders admitting to or rejecting wills from probate. 24 The exception in this provision, "except orders
admitting to or rejecting wills from probate," 25 only applies to express admittance or rejection of a will by a probate court, excluding other
orders even
26
though they may have the effect of admitting or rejecting a will.

B. The Special Statute ofLimitation: Missouri Revised Statutes Section
4 73.050
As early as 1894, the Missouri Supreme Court distinguished general
statutes of limitations from other statutory regimes that limited the time pe18. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 386.510 (2000).
19. Id.
20. State ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. v. Broan, 795 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.
1990) (en banc).
21. Id. at 387-88 (quoting 14 AM. JUR. 2d Certiorari§ 2 (1964)).
22. State ex rel. Kan. & Tex. Coal Ry. v. Shelton. 55 S.W. 1008, 1012 (Mo.
1900) (en banc); see also State ex rel. Palmer v. Elliff, 58 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Mo.
1933) (per curiam); Boren v. Welty, 4 Mo. 250, 251-52 (1835) (Certiorari "was never
used for the purpose of reversing a judgment of the inferior court."); State ex rel.Hill
v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (Certiorari "cannot be made to
serve the purpose of an appeal or writ of error.").
23. Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.160 (2000).
24. Id. at § 472.160.1(14).
25. Id.
26. See Politte v. Politte (In re Politte's Estate), 460 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1970) (per curiam) (concluding that such a rejection "must be based on the invalidity of the purported will" to be covered by the statute).
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riod within which an action could be brought.27 The court named these other
statutes of limitation "special,, 28 and differentiated them from general statutes
of limitation because special statutes are created by the same means that allow for the causes of action to which they apply.29 The court also held that
special statutes of limitation are "exclusive of other statutes of limitation,"
meaning that special statutes of limitation preempt all other periods of limitation and their implicitly-attached exceptions. 30 By 1897, the court had applied
this special designation to a statute limiting the contest of a will to "'within
five years after the probate or rejection thereof,"' establishing that the terminology of "special statute" applies to the probate code. 3 1 This precedent continues to be authoritative.
The modem version of the Missouri Probate Code provision which limits the time within which a will may be exhibited for proof is Missouri Revised Statutes section 473.050. In relevant part, the statute requires:
3. No proof shall be taken of any will nor a certificate of probate
thereof issued unless such will has been presented within the applicable time set forth as follows:

27. See Davenport v. City of Hannibal, 25 S.W. 364 (Mo. 1894) (discussing Mo.
REV. ST. § 2275 (1889), which is a statute requiring that all writs of error be brought
within three years after the rendering of a judgment or decision).
28. Id. at 364-65.
29. See, e.g., Stowe v. Stowe, 41 S.W. 951, 953-54 (Mo. 1897). The means by
which a special statute of limitation is created may not necessarily be the same statute
creating a given cause of action; rather, such a differentiation distinguishes statutory
causes of action, which may be governed by special statutes of limitation, from those
that exist solely in the common law and are only governed by general statutes of limitation.
30. Id. at 954; see also Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915, 919 (Mo. 1958)
(holding that a special statute of limitations is exclusive). Such exclusivity necessarily
prohibits exceptions that would apply to a general statute of limitations, such as fraud
or concealment. See State ex rel. Bier v. Bigger, 178 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Mo. 1944)
(holding that a special statute of limitations cannot be tolled because of any reason not
provided in the statute); see also State ex rel. Plymesser v. Cleaveland, 387 S.W.2d
556, 560 (Mo. 1965) (affirming Bier); Kober v. Kober, 23 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Mo.
1929) (holding that neither failure to discover fraud nor concealment toll a statute that
does not allow for such exceptions). But see Howell v. Murphy, 844 S.W.2d 42, 47
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a statute limiting a wrongful death cause of action
to five years from the time of death was tolled by concealment because the law would
not permit a missing person to be presumed dead until he or she has been missing for
at least five years).
31. Stowe, 41 S.W. at 953 (quoting GEN. ST. MO. §29 (1865)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss3/7
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(2) In cases where notice has not previously been given in accordance with section 473.033 of the granting of letters on the estate
of testator, within one year after the date of death of the testator;

5. A will not presented for probate within the time limitations prosection is forever barred from admisvided in subsection 3 of this
32
sion to probate in this state.
Section 473.050 contains no provisions for excepting the absolute bar in
paragraph five. Additionally, once the time limitation has passed, probate
jurisdiction only to order that a will was presented in an untimely
courts have
33
fashion.
C. The Servicemembers' Civil ReliefAct
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA) is the latest development
in a series of laws designed to protect men and women serving in the United
States Armed Forces from a variety of proceedings "that may adversely affect
[their] civil rights." '34 Enacted in 2003, the SCRA is the latest version of a
series of laws dating back to the Civil War. 35 The original Civil War era statute was relatively simple by contemporary standards, and mainly functioned
to prevent service to the United States from acting against the interest of
those who served.3 6
In comparison, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) of
1918 was a complicated piece of legislation that, having exired by its own
3
was largely reprovision six months after the termination of World War I,
stated in the SSCRA of 1940.38 Though the Act has been amended no fewer
32. Mo. REV. STAT. § 473.050 (2000).
33. See Politte v. Politte (In re Politte's Estate), 460 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1970) (per curiam).
34. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 502(2) (2000).
35. See Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. Nos. 108-189, 117 Stat.
2835 (1940) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C app. §§ 501-596 (2000)); Soldiers' and
Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 20, 40 Stat. 440 (1918); Lt. Colin A. Kisor, Who's Defending the Defenders?: Rebuilding the FinancialProtections of the Soldiers' and
Sailors' ReliefAct, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 161, 161-62 (2001). During the American Civil
War, the Federal Government enacted laws limiting civil and criminal actions against
Union soldiers and sailors, an act that was soon mirrored by several of the Confederate States. Id. at 161.
36. Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123.
37. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 20, § 603, 40 Stat. 440, 449
(1918).
38. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, 54 Stat. 1178 (1940).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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than eleven times since its revival in World War I1,39 much of the material
language from the original 1918 version has survived in the modem SCRA.4 °
Today, the SCRA as a whole is comprehensive in its approach to protecting servicemembers from a variety of civil liabilities that result from or
may be complicated by their service to the United States. Ultimately, the
SCRA enshrines the rights of servicemembers to pursue claims at home while
simultaneously protecting those persons who have claims against 41
active servicemembers that might be impossible to reach in a timely fashion.
The section of the SCRA at issue in Perry, section 526,42 serves a similar purpose as the very earliest Act in 1864. 43 Section 526 forbids including

39. Before 2003, the SSCRA was amended in 1942, 1944, 1948, 1952, 1958,
1960, 1962, 1966, 1972, and 1990. Kisor, supra note 35, at 163.
40. Compare:

That the period of military service shall not be included in computing any
period now or hereafter to be limited by any law for the bringing of any
action by or against any person in military service or by or against his
heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action
shall have accrued prior to or during the period of such service.
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, ch. 20, § 205, 40 Stat. 440, 443 (1918), and:
The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law for the bringing of any action by or against any person in military service or by or against his heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns, whether such cause of action shall
have accrued prior to or during the period of such service.
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, § 205, 54 Stat. 1178, 1181
(1940), with:
The period of a servicemember's military service may not be included in
computing any period limited by law, regulation, or order for the bringing
of any action or proceeding in a court, or in any board, bureau, commission, department, or other agency of a State (or political subdivision of a
State) or the United States by or against the servicemember or the servicemember's heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns.
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 526(a) (2000).
41. See generally 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-596 (2000).
42. Prior to the 2003 republication of the Act, the tolling statute was codified in
50 U.S.C. app. §525.
43. The entire text of the original act seems dedicated to the issue of limitation
periods:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States ofAmerica in Congress assembled, That whenever, during the exis-

tence of the present rebellion, any action, civil or criminal, shall accrue
against any person who, by reason of resistance to the execution of the
laws of the United States, or the interruption of the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, cannot be served with process for the commencement
of such action or the arrest of such person, or whenever, after such action,
civil or criminal, shall have accrued, such person cannot, by reason of
such resistance of the laws, or such interruption of judicial proceedings,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol71/iss3/7
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"[t]he period of a servicemember's military service . . . in computing any
period limited" by statutes, court orders, and orders from most state and federal agencies. 44 This provision of the SCRA, like that of its predecessor, the
SSCRA, applies not only to active duty military personnel, but also to reservists on active duty,45 national guardsmen who have been called up by the
president or secretary of defense for service, 46 civilians bringing acts against
any qualifying servicemembers,47 partnerships in which at least one partner
was a qualifying servicemember, 48 and the heirs, 49 beneficiaries, 50 and assigns 51 of qualifying servicemembers. However, this section is limited to
servicemembers in active service or those who inherit their legal rights, and
has been held not to apply to retired military personnel, 52 civilian employees
be arrested or served with process for the commencement of the action,
the time during which such person shall so be beyond the reach of legal
process shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited by
law for the commencement of such action.
Act of June 11, 1864, ch. 118, 13 Stat. 123.
44. 50 U.S.C. app. §526(a) (2000). Specifically, the statute forbids the periods
limiting any "law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding in
a court, or in any board, bureau, commission, department, or other agency of a State
(or political subdivision of a State) or the United States." Id. Its predecessor has even
been applied to a period of limitations found in a contract provision. See Steinfeld v.
Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 112 A. 800, 800 (N.H. 1921) (holding that the 1918
SSCRA applies to an indemnity insurance policy). But see Opsal v. United Servs.
Auto. Assn., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 358 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that under California law, Steinfeld is not dispositive of whether the SSCRA tolls a contractual time
limitation).
45. See, e.g., Mouradian v. John Hancock Cos., No. 88-2072, 1989 WL 225052,
at *2 (1st Cir. May 26, 1989) (per curiam); see also Markowitz v. Carpenter, 211 P.2d
617 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (holding that inactive service in the reserves does not entitle
litigant to protection of provision of the SSCRA).
46. National Guardsmen are covered during "service under a call to active service authorized by the President or the Secretary of Defense for a period of more than
30 consecutive days under section 502(f) of title 32, United States Code, for purposes
of responding to a national emergency declared by the President and supported by
Federal funds." 50 U.S.C. app. § 51 1(2)(A)(ii) (2000). The Act apparently does not
contemplate extended periods of National Guard service under the auspices of State
governance.
47. See, e.g., Ray v. Porter, 464 F.2d 452, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1972); Henderson v.
Miller, 477 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tenn. 1972).
48. See Crawford v. Adams, 213 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App. 1948).
49. See, e.g., Easterling v. Murphey, 11 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App. 1928).
50. See, e.g., Chichester v. Chichester, 48 So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1950).
51. This includes subrogees, see Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Manhattan Lighterage
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), and bankruptcy trustees, see In re Meade, 60
F. Supp. 69 (D. Mass. 1945).
52. E.g., Jax Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Fahenbruch, 429 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
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of the armed services, 53 or family members who had not directly inherited the
legal rights of servicemembers. 54 Further, there is little authority outside of
the statutory language as to when this section applies to members of the National Guard, 55 though it56is clear that local National Guard training does not
qualify as active service.

A split of authority exists as to whether those in career military service
must demonstrate that their ability to bring or defend against a suit has been
handicapped by their service. The dominant line of cases holds that section
526 applies unconditionally to career military personnel. 57 This includes servicemembers who are stationed domestically, an inclusion that has given
birth to the claim that "absurd results" may consequentially arise. 58 In the
opposing line of cases, several courts have held that relief under the SCRA is
"discretionary" and will only be applied if the court finds 59
that the defendant
was prejudiced or "materially affected" by military service.
The cases in this second line were called into doubt by the Supreme
Court's holding in Conroy v. Aniskoff.6° The majority in Conroy held that
there was no support for the argument that application of section 526 of the
SCRA 6 1 is conditioned upon a showing of "hardship or prejudice., 62 The
Court went further, claiming that the express inclusion of a demonstration of
prejudice in a number of other sections of the Act and the legislative history
both serve to support a literal construction of the section excluding all necessity of demonstrating hardship from the application of section 526.63
53. E.g., Hart v. United States, 1953 WL 6110 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
54. E.g., Wanner v. Glen Ellen Corp., 373 F. Supp. 983 (D. Vt. 1974).
55. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 51 1(2)(A)(ii) (West 2004); see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56. Bowen v. United States, 292 F.3d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
57. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515-18 (1993) (reasoning that the
omission of a prejudice requirement in former section 525, now section 526, was a
deliberate act of Congress); see also e.g., Bickford v. United States, 656 F.2d 636,
641 n.9 (Ct. Cl. 1981); McCance v. Lindau, 492 A.2d 1352 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1985). The court in McCance recognized that "absurd results may ensue" from such a
doctrine, and implicitly lamenting that it was without power to change it, described
the tolling provision of the SSCRA as a "Damoclean sword" that "was placed there
by Congress." Id. at 1357.
58. See, e.g., McCance, 492 A.2d at 1357.
59. Crouch v. United Techs. Corp., 533 So. 2d 220, 223 (Ala. 1988); see also
Pannell v. Continental Can Co., 554 F.2d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
tolling provisions of the SSCRA are inapplicable to a career serviceman not demonstrably handicapped by military service); King v. Zagorski, 207 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1968).
60. 507 U.S. 511 (1993).
61. The Court was actually reviewing section 525 of the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, which is today section 526 of the SCRA. Id. at 512.
62. Id. at 511.
63. Id. at 515-18.
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In his concurrence with the majority in Conroy, Justice Scalia cited excerpts of the legislative history of the SCRA to outline his disagreement with
the majority's assertion that the history supported its holding. Scalia found
that the original 1918 SSCRA was explicitly intended to "permit denial of
protection to members of the military who could show no hardship."65 The
legislative history of the 1940 Act, which was a "'substantial reenactment' of
the 1918 Act,'66 its amendment in 1942, and its indefinite extension in the
Selective Service Act of 1948,67 demonstrated the same intention "to protect
those who were prejudiced by military service" rather than all career servicemembers. 68 Despite finding that the legislative history was in contravention of the majority's opinion, Scalia claimed that the language of the statute
clearly indicated that no finding of prejudice to the servicemember is necessary to apply the tolling provisions of the Act. 69 Scalia maintained that if
of the legislative
Congress intended a different result, as cursory examination
70
history indicated, it would have to correct its own mistake.
Missouri courts have had only a few opportunities to deal with section
526 of the SCRA. In an early case, Warinner v. Nugent, the court held that
the tolling provision protects both servicemembers and those who have
claims against them, and consequentially tacked the defendant's period of
military service on to a five year statute of limitations to allow a suit that otherwise would have been barred.7'
The Missouri Supreme Court treated the subject with more depth in
Worlow v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp, a case in which a plaintiff sought a
wrongful death action for the death of his mother.72 In Worlow, the court held
that the tolling provisions of the SCRA are mandatory rather than discretionary, and that "[a] showing of prejudice to the person in military service is"
unnecessary. 73 Additionally, the court determined that Congress intended to
modify all statutory time limitations on rights of action that "did not exist
independently of the statute., 74 The Worlow court ultimately remanded the
64. Id.at 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 522.
66. Id. (quoting Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943)).
67. An Act "to amend the Act of August 1, 1947, to clarify the position of the
Secretary of the Air Force with respect to such Act, and to authorize the Secretary of
Defense to establish six additional positions in the professional and scientific service,
and for other purposes." Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 624, 62 Stat. 604.
68. Conroy, 507 U.S. at 525-26 (Scalia, J., concurring).
69. Id.at 527-28. There is a stinging comment by the majority (other than Justice
Thomas) regarding its disagreement with Scalia's conclusions regarding the meaning
and usefulness of legislative history. Id. at 518 n.12 (majority opinion).
concurring).
70. Id. at 528 (Scalia, J.,
71. Warinner v. Nugent, 240 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. 1951) (per curiam).
72. Worlow v. Miss. River Fuel Corp., 444 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1969) (per curiam).
73. Id.at 463-64.
74. Id.at 464.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 7
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

case to a lower court for a finding of fact regarding the plaintiff's military
service, but not before holding that the SCRA preempts the period of limitations imposed by the provisions of Missouri's wrongful death statute. 71 Worlow was the first case in Missouri to apply the tolling provision of the SCRA
to a special statute of limitations, 76 as Missouri's wrongful death statute is a
special statute not tolled for fraud or concealment.7 7
The last Missouri case in which the court addressed this issue, and the
only one discussing the SCRA's application to the probate code, was Ludwig
v. Anspaugh. 78 Ludwig involved a will contest by a necessary party who was
not notified as required by the 90-day notice provision in section 473.083.6 of
the Missouri code.79 However, because the party that was not notified was in
military service at the time the contest was filed, the court held that the tolling
provision of the SCRA applied to the statutory limitation.80 As discussed in
the dissent, the situation in Ludwig is distinguishable from Worlow because in
Ludwig, the tolling provisions of the SCRA were applied to a "service of
summons" statute that limits the time period within which a party can perfect
a timely-filed will contest, which is a "procedural step in the prosecution of
the action.",81 Effectively, the decision in Ludwig extended the application of
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501-596 (2000). section 526
to "any action," specifically8 2including those created by statute, will contests,
and actions at common law.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Perry, the court analyzed two main issues. Initially, the court dealt
with the procedural posture of the case, deciding whether the appeal was
properly before it.8 3 Next, the court determined whether section 526 of the
SCRA preempted Missouri Revised Statutes section 473.050.84 It did this in
two parts: first, by considering whether section 473.050 was a "statute of
limitations;" second, by deciding whether the SCRA was meant to apply to

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958) (holding that fraud does
not toll Missouri's wrongful death statute, then codified as Section 564.450 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes).
78. 785 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
79. Id. at 270.
80. Id. at 272.
81. Id. (Holstein, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (quoting Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 526 (2000).
83. State ex rel Estate of Perry v. Roper, 168 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Mo. Ct. App.
2005).
84. Id. at 585.
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section 473.050.85 After deciding these issues, the court addressed arguments
against applying the tolling provisions to section 473.050.86
The court began by examining whether Perry's direct appeal was properly before the court, because certiorari cannot substitute for an appeal.8 7 The
court discussed appeals in probate cases under Missouri law, 88 which provides that any interested person may appeal where there is a "final order or
judgment" of the probate court. 89 With a reminder that liberal construction is
the standard with regard to the finality of an order, the court dismissed the
argument that the circuit court's order rejecting Perry's petition was not final,
holding instead that the order was final and appealable because it disposed of
"all issues and parties in the case, leaving nothing for future determination., 90
The court then directed its attention to the exception contained within
the statute for "orders admitting to or rejecting wills from probate." 9' In the
view of the appellate court, since the probate court had dismissed the application based upon the statute of limitations without considering it on the merits,
the dismissal was not a "rejection" that would fall under the exception. 92 The
court also rejected the argument that section 473.050 was not a statute of
limitations, and held that the probate court's dismissal based on the running
of the statute was reviewable on appeal.93 Because the order was properly
before the court on appeal, certiorari would not lie, and the court quashed its
own writ of certiorari in favor of Perry's direct appeal.94
After establishing the propriety of Perry's appeal, the court turned its attention to the standard of review: that the pleadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff.95 The court held that Perry had affirmatively
averred his active duty service from January 2003 to July 2003, and that Perry
had asserted in a timely fashion that the statute of limitations for presenting
the will and filing an application for letters testamentary was tolled pursuant
to the SCRA. 9 6 The court determined that by simply dismissing Perry's original pleadings as barred by the statute of limitations,9 7 the probate court found
that the tolling provision of the SCRA 98 did not apply.99 After examining the
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587-89.
Id. at 582.
Id.

89. Mo. REv. STAT. § 472.160.1(14) (2000).
90. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 582-583.
91. MO. REV. STAT.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

§ 472.160.1(14).

Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 583.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 584.
Id.

97. The operable statute of limitations is MO. REV. STAT. § 473.050 (2000).

98. The tolling provision of the SCRA is 50 U.S.C. app. §526(a) (2000).
99. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 584.
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language of the statute of limitations, the court concluded that the statute
"would bar Perry's petition and application unless [it] ...was tolled."' °
The court then addressed the issue of whether the tolling provisions of
the SCRA applied to Missouri's probate statute of limitations. 10' Citing
Ludwig v. Anspaugh and referring to the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, 10 2 the court determined that if the tolling provision of the
SCRA applied to Missouri's statutes of limitations for presentment of a will
and filing of letters testamentary, the SCRA controlled and the period of limi10 3
tations was tolled while Perry was serving on active duty in the military.
This analysis distilled for the court the "ultimate issue" of the instant case:
"whether [section 526] of the SCRA applies to toll the limitations period set
forth in § 473.050."'0 4
Citing section 473.050 as a "special statute of limitations to which the
regular tolling provisions under Missouri law [are] not applicable,"'105 the
court discussed whether the SCRA was intended to modify all limits on rights
of action not existing outside of their statutory creation.106 The court examined two cases in which the Missouri Supreme Court applied the tolling provisions of the SCRA to non-traditional statutes of limitations: Worlow v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., and Ludwig v. Anspaugh.10 7 Because Perry's petition for presentment and application for letters testamentary involved "judicial proceedings" that could have an adverse affect on his civil rights, and
both the petition and application instituted "proceedings" that he "had a right
to bring, if timely filed, in the probate court," the court held that section
526(a) acted to toll the limitations period contained in section 473.050.108

100. Id.
101. Id. at 584-89.
102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The court went so far as to spell out the rather
obvious proposition that "'Missouri Courts are obliged to apply federal law."' Perry,
168 S.W.3d at 585 (quoting State ex rel Nixon v. McClure, 969 S.W.2d 801, 804-05
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
103. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 585 (citing Ludwig v. Anspaugh, 785 S.W.2d 269 (Mo.
1990) (en banc)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 586.
106. Id. (citing Worlow v. Miss. River Fuel Corp., 444 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Mo.
1969) (per curiam)).
107. See Ludwig v. Anspaugh, 785 S.W.2d 269 (Mo. 1990) (en banc) (holding
that the SCRA tolls the period limitations on perfecting a timely-filed will contest by
securing service of process within 90 days of filing the petition); Worlow, 444 S.W.2d
461 (holding that the SCRA tolls the period of limitations on Missouri's wrongful
death statute). Ludwig also articulated Missouri's "policy interest in furthering the
prompt settling of estates and in expediting prosecution of will contests" but stated
that "[tihis salutary policy must give way . . . to the mandatory tolling provisions
made by Congress." Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 586 (alteration in original).
108. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 586-87.
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The court discussed this result in light of Congress' intent that Perry
should not be concerned with the legal proceedings with regard to his father's
will while he was in active service and framed the decision in Ludwig as controlling. 109 The court reasoned that a special statute of limitation, like the one
in section 473.050, was not excepted from the tolling provision in the SCRA,
particularly because Congress had "explicitly and unambiguously" excluded
other types of proceedings "as it did in 50 U.S.C. [a]pp. § 527," which excluded periods of limitation under federal internal revenue laws.' 10 Because
there was not a similar provision pertaining to special statutes of limitation
court
generally, or periods of limitation in probate matters specifically, the
I
II
found that such an exception could not be inferred in the instant case.
When the court examined the cases relied on for the argument that the
tolling provisions of the SCRA should not apply, it distinguished the application of the SCRA's tolling provision to probate proceedings from facially
contrary doctrines in those cases as applied by courts in other states. t 2 The
court also found unpersuasive the claim that application of the SCRA's tolling provisions to the presentment of wills would lead to the "absurd result" of
allowing interested individuals to circumvent the statute of limitations by
simply engaging an active duty serviceperson to present the will.l 3 The court
relied on the doctrine that estate administration only commences when an
interested party files an application for letters testamentary or letters of administration. 114 Thus, the court found that non-interested servicemembers
would not be able to commence the administration of an estate, and the
SCRA would not allow an interested party who is not an active duty servicemember to do so more than one year after the death of the decedent. 115 The
court closed by asserting that such a result would not impose a burden greater
than did the holding in Ludwig that tolled the period of limitations for will
109. Id. at 587.
110. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re A.H. Robins
Co.), 996 F.2d 716, 719-20 (4th Cir. 1993)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 588. The cases discussed by the court were McCoy v. Atl. Coast Line
R.R. Co., 47 S.E.2d 532, 534 (N.C. 1948) (questioning whether the tolling provision
of the SCRA was meant to apply to probate proceedings), McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,
46 A.2d 307, 309 (Md. 1946) (excepting the filing of a will from the SCRA's requirement found in 50 U.S.C. app. § 521 (2000) that a plaintiff must file an affidavit
prior to the entry of judgment regarding the defendant's military service, but also
assuming that the tolling provisions applied to a period of limitations upon caveat
after probate), and Case v. Case, 124 N.E.2d 856, 861 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1955) (holding
that the SCRA, specifically 50 U.S.C. app. § 521, did not apply to proceedings to
admit a will into probate in Ohio). Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 588.
113. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 588.
114. Id. The court does discuss that Missouri law allows non-interested parties to
present a will or codicil, but cautions that presentment does not equate with commencement of administration of the estate. Id. at 589 n.10.
115. Id. at 588.
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contests, and held that the SCRA applied to Missouri's probate statute of
limitations.' 16
In conclusion, the court reversed and remanded the case to the probate
court for a hearing to determine whether Perry's service was valid and if so,
whether it persisted long enough to toll the statute of limitations. " 7 If the
prohate court so found, it was directed to reinstate
Perry's petition for pre118
sentment and application for letters testamentary.
V. COMMENT

The court's first decision, that Perry's appeal was properly before the
court, was undoubtedly correct. When the probate court denied Perry's petition for presentment and application for letters testamentary, the court in fact
left "nothing for future determination," and as such was a "final and appealable" order."19 Even the most persuasive argument to the contrary, that the
statute of limitations was a jurisdictional prerequisite and the probate court
lacked jurisdiction to do anything other than dismiss the case, fails because
such a dismissal is still appealable.120 Consequently, the court was absolutely
correct to quash its fallaciously issued writ of certiorari and take up the direct
appeal in its place.
Next, the court was correct in finding that section 473.050 is a statute of
limitations, albeit a special one. The body of case law surrounding this statute
does not ever seriously question that it is, and facially, the mere fact that it is
a "statute" that "limits" the time period in which action must be taken would
necessitate its classification thereas even had it not been deemed so in prior
cases. 21 However, even if it were found not to be a statute of limitations, the
Supreme Court of Missouri's ruling in Worlow122 that the tolling provision of
the SCRA was 'intended to modify not only those statutes properly called
statutes of limitations ...

but statutes creating a right of action which did not

exist independently of the statute where the time for bringing such an action
is limited in some way"' would govern section 473.050 regardless of whether
or not it was branded a "statute of limitations. ' 23 In applying the SCRA to
section 473.050, the court has done exactly what Congress and the United
States Constitution required it to do.
116. Id. at 589.
117. Id.
118. Id.

119. Id. at 583 (quoting Clark v. Clark (In re Estate of Clark), 83 S.W.3d 699, 702
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002)).
120. Id. (citing Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 152 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Mo.
2004) (en banc)).
121. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
122. Worlow v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 444 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. 1969)
123. Id. at 464 (quoting Stutz v. Guardian Cab Corp., 74 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822-23
(N.Y. App. Div. 1947).
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As the court correctly found, the purpose of the SCRA is clear: to protect those who, like Perry, are engaged in military service for the entirety of a
period of limitations. 24 The fact that Congress has specifically excepted Internal Revenue statutes from the tolling provisions of the Act is further evidence of this proposition.125 Presumably, Congress had the knowledge and
the opportunity to except those special statutory periods of limitation that do
not toll for fraud, concealment, or other extraordinary circumstances that
ordinarily toll general statutes of limitation. That it refrained from doing so is
a tacit endorsement of the supremacy of the tolling provision in the SCRA.
Read in a vacuum, the instant decision is undoubtedly correct. Assuming
the fact of Perry's service, it was unnecessary and perhaps even burdensome
for him to file an application for letters testamentary while in military service,
and the delay in the administration of his father's estate was a mere few
months longer than the statutory period would ordinarily allow. Perry's father, the decedent, had specifically nominated him to serve as executor of the
will, a desire that would have been thwarted but for the tolling of the statute
of limitations.' 26 The result here is just, and in this case the delay is nominal
enough that no real harm is caused by such a tolling of the statute of limitations. However, there are policy implications that the court did not address.
The recent history of cases refusing to require a demonstration of prejudice by career servicemembers leaves open the door to the possibility that
results contrary to Missouri's stated policy interest in furthering "the prompt
settling of27 estates and [in expediting] prosecution of will contests," will be
realized. 1
As career servicemembers are rightly considered to be "on active duty,"
such service could potentially be indefinite. Because courts do not require a
demonstration of prejudice for such servicemembers to invoke the tolling
provisions of the SCRA, 28 the instant decision could stand for the proposition that career servicemembers may be allowed to indefinitely postpone probate proceedings, because they are not specifically exempted by the Act. The
relatively small impact that the instant decision would have in the lack of
such a requirement, being limited only to matters of probate, is compounded
124. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519-28 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia confesses that he has not "personally investigated" the entire body of
legislative history on the subject; nonetheless, his analysis of key provisions offers a
succinct and thorough discussion of the issue and provides a starting point for further

examination. Id. at 527-28.
125. See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §526(c) (2000).
126. Perry, 168 S.W.3d at 581 n.1.
127. Ludwig v. Anspaugh, 785 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).

128. This view of career servicemember eligibility, firmly established by the Supreme Court in Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 516-18 (1993), is seemingly entirely dominant in recent caselaw. The opposing view, that a demonstration of prejudice is required before career servicemembers can invoke the tolling provisions of the
SCRA, has not been upheld since Conroy.
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when it is considered in light of Worlow, which applied the tolling provisions
of the SCRA to Missouri's wrongful death statute, and Ludwig,129 which applied the provisions to a procedural matter. Viewed in concert, these three
cases strongly support the notion that the SCRA tolls all periods of limitation
not specifically excepted from section 526 within the SCRA itself.
Such a result is legally correct, but ignores the potential for abuse by career servicemembers, especially those who, though stationed in the domestic
United States, could still invoke the tolling provision of the SCRA. When
viewed alongside the fact that it is unclear whether National Guard soldiers in
a similar circumstance would not be afforded the same
consideration by the
30
SCRA, the result begins to appear manifestly unjust.
The opinion in Perry'3 does not describe the nature of Perry's service,
but under Worlow, which has been subsequently buttressed by the Supreme
Court's holding in Conroy,132 that nature is immaterial. In the case of will
presentment, a domestically stationed servicemember could be in a good position, physically and vocationally, to receive notice and file petition within
the statutory period of time, but could instead elect not to do so simply because of the SCRA's mandatory tolling provision. As this presumably extends to all time limitations imposed by statute or other functions operating in
a governmental capacity, there are a variety of circumstances under which a
servicemember could potentially use this tolling provision to delay adjudication or revive prior actions. One example of such an undesirable scenario
could involve a servicemember excluded from a will contesting its administration long after all other parties involved thought the issue was settled.
This kind of unintended result could come from and unfairly benefit
those with actions involving or against servicemembers as well. A claimant
could revive an action after an indefinite amount of time in which there is a
single interested party in career military service, even though the claimant
could with little or no difficulty have notified or instituted an action against
them. Because no showing of hardship is necessary under Conroy, this provision could be used strategically and in bad faith by savvy individuals. In addition to potentially harming unsuspecting individuals who believe an issue to
be settled, such a development would inevitably serve to undermine the
claims of those servicemembers who truly are meant to be protected by the
SCRA, especially considering that with increasingly long periods of overseas
deployment for active duty members, guardsmen, and reservists, the need for
such protection is as strong now as ever.
Despite the possibility for an "absurd" result, the court found itself in a
difficult position if it hoped to remedy this particular problem. Faced with the
narrowly defined issue before it, the court decided Perrycorrectly. It is clear
129. Ludwig, 785 S.W.2d 269.
130. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
131. Perry, 168 S.W.3d 77.
132. Conroy, 507 U.S. 511.
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from both the statutory language and the prior decisions in the Supreme Court
and Missouri courts that section 526 of the SCRA is meant to apply to all
statutory periods of limitation, whether they be "general" or, as in the instant
case, "special." Indeed, the court's only possible alternative with regard to the
application of the SCRA to probate law would have been to decide against
Ludwig and cast Worlow into doubt by ruling that the tolling provisions of the
SCRA simply did not apply to the statutory period of limitations contained in
section 473.050. Such a ruling would be at best inconsistent with the body of
case law on the subject and may well have carried little weight on further
appeal.
Unfortunately, the possibility of such a result, inconsistent with the policy of efficient adjudication, still lingers. Because Congress refrained from
clarifying the issue of career servicemembers and the lack of a requisite
showing of prejudice when it revisited the Act in 2003, courts will undoubtedly uphold Conroy's result in future litigation. Should this issue arise again,
the courts are without the power to unilaterally remedy the situation, and
Congress must act if it wishes to prevent the potential for limitless time periods concerning, among other things, filing of a new will by career servicemembers.
Nonetheless, acting within the scope of its authority, the Court of Appeals rightly decided this case. Should the issue of whether another statute of
limitations is tolled by section 526 of the SCRA that has as-of-yet remained
undecided by the courts arise, State ex rel. Perry v. Roper will solidify the
body of case law which requires such statutes be tolled.

VI. CONCLUSION
Due to recent U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the resulting call-up of Reservists and National Guardsmen to active duty, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act will no doubt see increasing amounts of litigation in the near future. The language of the statute and the fact that Congress
declined to alter it in the face of broad judicial interpretation make it unequivocal that the tolling provision is intended to protect all qualifying servicemembers from all periods of limitation not specifically excepted by the
Act. For the most part, the results of this legislation will be just, and prevent
harm to and by those men and women serving in the armed forces of the
United States of America. However, those persons assuming that the requisite
period of time has run on an action adverse to their interests must be aware of
the potential for a servicemember, career or otherwise, to make use of the
SCRA to revive actions that would otherwise be proscribed by law. Unless
and until Congress changes the requirements of the tolling provisions within
the Act, qualifying servicemembers are entitled to toll almost any statute
throughout the duration of their service for any or no reason at all.
ALFRED J. LUDWIG
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